



# IcARUS

INNOVATING URBAN SECURITY IN EUROPE

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Report describing the results from the  
workshop for assessing requirements



D 2.3

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### Report describing the results from the workshop for assessing requirements

**DELIVERABLE TYPE**

Report

**MONTH AND DATE OF DELIVERY**

Month 21, 31 May 2022

**WORK PACKAGE**

WP 2

**LEADER**

CAMINO



**DISSEMINATION LEVEL**

Public

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Programme

H2020

Contract Number

882749

Duration

48 Months

Start

September,  
2020



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## Revision History

VERSION	DATE	REVIEWER	MODIFICATIONS
1 <sup>st</sup> draft	17/05/2022	Adam Crawford, Susan Donkin, University of Leeds	Review and Modifications
1 <sup>st</sup> draft	20/05/2022	Werner van Herle, CCC	Review

1 <sup>st</sup> draft	23/05/2022	Mercedès Soro-Posac, CCC	Review and Modifications
1 <sup>st</sup> draft	23/05/2022	Tim Chapman, EAB	Review
1 <sup>st</sup> draft	24/05/2022	Julia Rettig, Efus	Review and Modifications
2 <sup>nd</sup> draft	29/05/2022	Julia Rettig, Efus	Review

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## 1 Introduction

The IcARUS project brings together researchers and practitioners from a wide range of geographical and professional backgrounds and engages them in a collaborative process to design solutions to pressing challenges in urban security. More specifically, as laid out in the Grant Agreement, it

*“... seeks to facilitate a transformation in the application and utilisation of the knowledge base in urban security by adopting existing innovative tools to develop an adaptable toolkit for security actors to better respond to urban security issues.”*

Methodologically, the project will seek to achieve this aim via a four-step programme, that is conceptualised in four topical work packages: WP2 “Review and cross analysis of urban security”, WP3 “Toolkit development using social and technological innovation”, WP4 Toolkit demonstrations and implementation”, and WP5 “Communication, dissemination and impact”.

Task 2.3 is situated at the conclusion of WP2 and is supposed to support the transition and transfer between WP2 and WP3. Specifically, the task included the facilitation of a workshop to involve all project partners and bodies in a discussion on the outcomes of WP2, assess their requirements in light of the activities planned for the following WPs, and to assure that their knowledge and perspectives are taken into account for the project programming. This workshop was held in-situ in Berlin on 12 and 13 April 2022 and brought together all project partners as well as the expert advisory board and the consultative committee of cities.

The overall aim of the workshop was to contribute to the transfer of results from review and cross-analysis to toolkit development. More specifically, its tangible objectives were threefold. It sought to

- Showcase and discuss the state-of-the-art report (task 2.1) and inventory of practices (task 2.2).
- Discuss the local security challenges identified in the six partner cities and concretise the strategic approach to address them locally.
- Assure a transfer and adaptation of knowledge in light of specific local contexts, opportunities and capacities.

The workshop was therefore an opportunity to reflect on how the relationship between research and practice in the field of urban security should be shaped. The participants gave concrete considerations on how to ensure that the research results from WP2 can be considered in the following project activities and how the practice of the actors participating in the project and the local stakeholders can benefit from them. For this purpose, fundamental questions of knowledge transfer and project implementation were discussed, and concrete conclusions were drawn for the further work in the project. The following sections summarise key results of the workshop and provide recommendations for the further implementation of IcARUS.

## 2 Review and cross-analysis of urban security

Part one of the workshop focussed on presenting and discussion the two research reports produced in WP2: the report describing the state of the art and cross analysis of the focus areas (D2.1) and the report describing the inventory of practices, tools and lessons learnt (D2.2). Initially the reports were presented and discussed individually, a consequential session was dedicated to synergies and divergences. The following section sums up key themes from the presentations and discussions.

### 2.1 Report describing the state of the art and cross analysis of the focus areas (D2.1)

#### 2.1.1 Summary of the presentation by the University of Leeds

##### *The knowledge base on urban security*

Despite considerable progress over the past 30 years, the knowledge base on urban security lags behind other areas of public policy. The accumulated knowledge is often not implemented or applied in practice. Urban security interventions are often poorly informed by research findings. They rarely specify the theories of change or assumed impact chains they apply to achieve desired outcomes. Interventions rarely include rigorous evaluation.

##### *Evidence base: knowledge, methods, data and evaluation*

Much of the focus in the literature has been on establishing methodologically rigorous evaluations. This focus on ‘what works’ and the search for off-the-shelf ‘universal solutions’ has led to local and situational contextual factors often being ignored. However, more attention should be paid to the relationship- and process-based mechanisms that promote change. Evaluation is important for accountability, strengthening institutional development and informing accumulated learning. Evaluation needs to be integrated into interventions in a way that informs what works, where, for whom and under what conditions. In measuring urban security outcomes, crime data collected by the police alone is not enough. Different types of data need to be collected from and shared between institutions.

##### *Process models of problem solving*

Problem-solving approaches provide a solid framework to specify the nature of any given security problems/contexts and guide practitioners. These approaches are even more effective when end users and beneficiaries are involved in the definition of the specific problems and their underlying conditions. The implementation of problem-oriented approaches usually focuses on the resources and capacities of existing organisations – especially the police. The focus should be on a problem-oriented partnership rather than a solution that pretends to be problem-oriented.

##### *Priority Areas*

In the **prevention of juvenile delinquency**, early intervention and developmental programmes are increasingly popular due to their success. Multi-risk component interventions targeted at



multiple risk factors appeared to be more successful than single-factor interventions. There are enduring tensions between universal versus targeted (risk-based) interventions. Most of the juvenile delinquency literature comes from a North American perspective. There is a distinct lack of literature which exclusively discussed European focused interventions and programmes. The literature demonstrated a varying spectrum of scientific rigour concerning research design and assessment, and generally a lack of research that considers measures relating to the progression of juvenile delinquency acts and implications for future engagement with the criminal justice system.

In the field of **Preventing Radicalisation leading to Violent Extremism** many individual risk factors overlap with juvenile delinquency. Thus, they are not suitable as predictive tools. Lately the debate has shifted and now tends to focus more on protective factors: non-violent peers, bonding to school, attachment to society. The focus on protective factors leads to a holistic prevention approach focusing on building resilience and empowerment and is aimed at entire groups (e.g. adolescents): foster integration, civic values, critical thinking skills. The opportunity to participate in everyday democratic processes provides anchor to common value systems. There is a need for inclusive and community-focused prevention. There are differences between European countries regarding the prevention measures. For instance, Nordic countries have a more universal / holistic approach.

The research base on **Preventing and Reducing Trafficking and Organised Crime** shows that law enforcement approaches tend to dominate, but administrative approaches are successfully applied by cities as well. There is a need to identify underlying contexts driving supply and demand; examine and understand drivers facilitating trafficking and organised crime to effectively target responses and foster cross-jurisdictional collaboration between origin and destination countries. Multi-agency partnerships and inter-agency cooperation are vital to successful implementation.

Regarding the **Design and Management of Safe Public Spaces** the incorporation of preventive elements into the initial design of new products and services is more effective than retrofitting solutions. Aesthetics, accessibility, sustainability and social inclusion are considered in the management of safe public spaces. There is a focus on human-centred design solutions. The research emphasises that context matters: understanding the causes of social problems, the nature of social interactions and the ways in which people use and adapt to solutions/interventions. Community involvement in designing interventions creates a sense of (local) ownership and participation. Research highlights the value of compliance strategies that decentre the police and engage informal actors, civil society mediators and forms of persuasion, self-regulation and capacity building, rather than resort to coercive law enforcement, police, prosecution and punishment. Findings suggest that crime prevention strategies for public spaces are more effective than simply implementing formal prevention elements. Effective feedback and assessment from the community is a necessary element of any crime prevention strategy or initiative to improve the design and management of safe public spaces.

### *Design, Innovation and Technology*

The integration of preventive elements into any new product or service at its initial design is more effective than updating an existing solution.' It is important that aesthetics, accessibility, sustainability and social integration are taken into account. The commitment to collaborations between designers, manufacturers, architects, planners and end-users is emphasized. There are examples for the use of online space as a platform for positive interventions.

### *Effective Partnerships*

The siloed nature of services demands harnessing diverse actors through pooled resources, skills and capabilities in multi-agency partnerships. Effective multi-stakeholder partnerships require: shared ownership; clearly defined expectation of each partner; acknowledgement of asymmetries of power differentials; trust and information sharing and meaningful engagement with end-users and beneficiaries. Partners need to develop and foster shared values, understanding each other's priorities, values, positions and limitations.

### *Context and Implementation*

The research clearly shows that context matters: Nothing works everywhere but a lot of things work somewhere. Security is place and time dependent: A problem might appear to be the same, but the underlying nature of it may be very different, necessitating an alternative approach. Administrative structures, political leadership, institutional commitment and buy in from stakeholders are pivotal to success. Implementation failure is frequently a cause of ineffective interventions.

## 2.1.2 Questions and summary of the discussion

### *Knowledge transfer and implementation*

The review made it clear that the transfer of knowledge into practice is a major challenge of implementation. Different reasons and explanations for this were discussed:

#### *The academic bubble*

Science communication has improved, but not yet well enough in terms of transferring knowledge into practice and communicating with non-academics. They can feel intimidated by the academic language. It is important to think about how to make the research process more inclusive. For practical transfer, it is not enough to simply pass on information, e.g. in the form of guidelines. Instead, other ways of supporting implementation are needed.

#### *Political cultures, dealing with failure and constraints on innovation*

Politics and political cultures play an important role in why research and findings are not, or not always, taken into account. Urban security strategies are embedded in political life cycles and these are usually short-term. Learning processes, on the other hand, are long-term.

This makes learning from past experiences and mistakes difficult. There seems to be a great lack of knowledge about interventions, projects, policies, etc. that have not worked. In addition, there is pressure on NGOs and cities to prove the success of their work and projects. This 'project

logic' contributes to the fact that hardly anything is learned about what did not work. This is part of a culture where there is no dealing with failures.

In addition to the difficulties in learning from past experience, a pressure to innovate was problematised, which may also be a barrier to practice transfer and implementation. For example, some stakeholders often seem to be under pressure to do something innovative and to find their own, unique approach to a topic. This often seems to stand in the way of adapting and implementing approaches that have worked elsewhere. Political cultures can also play a role here. For example, city governments may refuse to adapt promising approaches that are associated with a competing political party or family. Such pressure to innovate seems to privilege the development of new or original approaches, while sometimes crucial question in terms of innovation is rather how we implement an approach in a different context.

Moreover, the notion of innovation needs further clarification. Oftentimes, also in European project contexts, innovation is closely associated with technology. However, it is more than this, it can be a product, a form of communication. IcARUS could help to change this understanding. A first step could be the development of a policy paper on innovation, explaining how IcARUS defines innovative approaches.

#### *Dissemination*

Many practices in urban security are not mainstreamed. One reason for this could be that projects are not participatory enough. Many stakeholders are not integrated into the academic process. If academic work was more participatory and inclusive and knowledge was more accessible from the beginning, dissemination would not be such a challenge.

Regarding the dissemination of the results in the IcARUS project, it was proposed to seek to further clarify some aspects of project communication, for example regarding the primary audiences beyond the project consortium, or the visibility of the project results after the end of the project. Moreover, it was suggested to develop practice sheets and factsheets to make sure that examples of good practice can be disseminated and to allow users to stay up to date with a developing practice or focus area.

#### *Priority areas*

Of the four focus areas, research on safe public spaces and youth crime has been well developed for decades. The topics of radicalisation and organised crime have experienced an upswing after 9/11 and after 2014. Research and expenditure on prevention have increased massively since then. In the field of radicalisation research, the initial focus was on knowing and determining who posed a risk. Currently, we see a shift towards more holistic approaches. In the thematic area of organised crime, there has been a shift in focus towards prevention and the integration of local communities in counterstrategies.

### *Cyberspace*

There was some surprise at the limited coverage of cyberspace in the Review, despite the fact that cyberspace plays a significant role in crime and especially youth delinquency and radicalisation. This was put down, at least in part, to the time-lag of research and the methodology used for the Review. In research and prevention on radicalisation and youth delinquency, more attention needs to be paid to the links and relationships between cyberspace and other areas and spaces. This is also partly attributed to the large time frame covered by the review and the time lag in producing and disseminating research. This raises the question of how the knowledge base can be used in the current context.

### *Roadmap*

The knowledge base has been lagging behind practice for at least a decade. Things change, times change. The challenge is to make the knowledge base relevant to today's context despite the time lag. How can knowledge be collected, used and reprocessed to support current challenges? There has to be a move from a descriptive review to a prescriptive roadmap for evidence-based practice. How can the retrospective be used for the prospective in the roadmap?

## **2.2 Report describing the inventory of practices, tools and lessons learnt (D2.2)**

### **2.2.1 Summary of the presentation by Efus**

#### *Review of municipal security strategies – Concepts, approaches and priorities*

One third of the strategies reviewed are in line with national security strategies. 81 % relate to and complement other urban (or regional) policies and strategies (family and youth services, health services, integration, education, climate change adaptation, urban planning, etc.). The focus is clearly on the need for cross-sectoral efforts in crime prevention and urban safety. Almost all of them take an integrated approach to urban safety based on multi-stakeholder cooperation. Two main trends emerge:

- Focus on capacity building, structures and procedures for better anticipation, assessment and monitoring.
- Emphasis on primary prevention, reducing inequalities, discrimination and marginalisation.

The municipal focus areas, based on the results of the Efus review of 21 municipal and regional security strategies and policies, are: 67% radicalisation, 57% public space, 52% juvenile crime, 33% organised crime.

### *Preventing Juvenile Delinquency*

Almost all reviewed strategies provide for prevention measures and activities targeting young people and children, half of them as a priority of their security policy. There is a strong and formalised cooperation between authorities and different actors (police and prison services, youth and child protection services, schools, (mental) health services, social workers and

mediators, and civil society organisations). The main challenges include: Delinquency and violence (38 %), alcohol and drug abuse (24 %), anti-social behaviour, e.g. bullying, vandalism (19 %), truancy and dropping out of school (12 %).

Most cities/regions implement primary prevention initiatives in schools (e.g. training for teachers and students on cyberbullying). The use of mediators in public spaces or schools is also common. There are also tailor-made interventions for individuals at risk or young offenders (group scan method). Several cities focus on a district level approach (steering committees composed of different public services/agencies and stakeholders).

#### *Preventing radicalisation leading to violent extremism*

Four cities mention combating right-wing extremism as a priority. One city mainly addresses jihadist returnees from conflict and war zones and their families as well as Islamist recruiters, 71% of the reviewed strategies implement primary prevention measures to reduce risk factors (marginalisation, discrimination and polarisation), 38% implement measures targeting vulnerable people and/or deradicalisation and reintegration initiatives. Key needs and priorities for cities include building assessment capacity and structures, knowledge about patterns and dynamics of radicalisation, collaboration with academic research, and strengthening victim support structures and coordination with other agencies at regional and national levels. Examples of approaches and methods include:

- bi-annual monitoring to assess the prevalence of extremist views and the population's perception of democracy.
- training opportunities and programmes, i.e. for front line practitioners, social workers, teachers, community organisers, police officers etc.
- communication campaigns.

#### *Preventing and reducing human trafficking and organised crime*

Seven cities/regions focus on combating organised crime and trafficking in human beings. Their biggest challenges include: human trafficking, child sexual abuse, 'modern slavery', drug and arms trafficking, influencing local businesses and money laundering.

Their approaches include multi-agency anti-trafficking units, including a civil society organisation specialising in victim support and the creation of action plans with 'zero tolerance' for petty crime and minor offences committed by members of organised crime groups. Two cities focus on victimisation (child protection and early intervention; reintegration of members of organised crime groups).

Tools and practices in the fight against organised crime include asset/property seizure, training programmes for city employees to better recognise signs of organised crime, and special permits for local businesses in vulnerable areas



### *Designing and managing safe public spaces*

For 57% of cities and regions, this is an important issue. The most important challenges include anti-social behaviour, nuisance, disturbance of the public peace (38%), crime scenes (19%), user conflicts (19%), protection from terrorist attacks/major threats (14%), Coping with citizens' sense of insecurity (14%). Solutions mainly include situational crime prevention measures (video surveillance, police) and comprehensive strategies to prevent the exclusion of users/groups as well as cooperation with urban development (e.g. security by design).

Better assessment capacities and structures were mentioned as the main need. Tools and practices include design measures, CCTV and place-based working groups (including citizens) for implementation (design measures, mediation processes and support for vulnerable groups) as well as exploratory walks with citizens.

### *Citizen participation in urban security and prevention policies*

Most cities/regions do not systematically involve citizens. Participation processes are planned or already taking place in the following areas:

- Assessment of citizens' perceptions of safety/feelings of insecurity.
- Citizen surveys to develop strategies (in five cities).
- regular information and consultation meetings with citizens (in two cities).
- Involving vulnerable groups in the development of their prevention and urban security strategy to strengthen the whole-of-society approach (planned in one city).

### *Technology*

The following were mentioned as measures to address challenges, e.g. cybercrime:

- Specialised cybercrime units.
- Improving the equipment and capacities of LEAs (training programmes).
- Cyber resilience programme (exchange platform for LEAs, private sector, citizens).

Majority of cities (plan) to use technology to better assess and anticipate crime. Two cities see technology as a way to improve communication and citizen participation

### *Gender*

Over half (57%) of the reviewed strategies emphasise the priority of addressing gender-based as well as anti-LGBT violence and improving support structures for victims. Five cities mention gender as a cross-cutting issue. They integrate a gender focus into safety assessments/audit procedures. Other gender strategies include the promotion of gender equality, combat gender stereotypes and discrimination among youth, implementation of gender budgeting and have a 50% share of women in leadership/management positions in the municipality.

## 2.2.2 Questions and summary of the discussion

### *Citizen participation*

Citizen participation is always a challenge. What is important here is the way we communicate and how citizens are integrated. What forms of participation can be made possible? There are countless examples of participation projects leading to frustration among those involved because they do not feel taken seriously and have the impression that it is more of a 'pseudo participation'. And conversely, the lack of participation can also lead to frustration among the initiators of the projects. It is important to define who should participate with which goal and how the target group can be reached. In turn, it is important to make the degree of participation in the sense of power sharing transparent to the target group so that participation does not become a meaningless and ineffective buzz-word.

One possibility mentioned in the discussion is to create future scenarios. This approach is envisioned in the local workshops with the IcARUS city partners.

### *Target groups of preventive strategies*

Most programmes and initiatives to prevent radicalisation focus on youth and children. Recent developments, e.g. regarding the spread of conspiracy ideologies during the pandemic have shown that radicalisation also takes place among the adult population, notably via the internet. It was suggested that there is a neglect of this phenomenon due to the deeply rooted problematisation of youth in security research. Given that there is no precedent to the increase of adults being radicalised as practitioners throughout Europe have observed it in the past two years, there is not a lot of practise experience or research regarding this phenomenon. Nonetheless, local prevention strategies need to adapt to these evolving dynamics and develop initiatives to reach out to the adult population, a target group which is harder to reach for public authorities and prevention programmes than younger groups.

### *Marginalisation and discrimination as risk factors*

Many cities emphasise that marginalisation and discrimination are risk factors for violence or radicalisation. However, the relationship between marginalisation and radicalisation is controversial in research. Emphasis is placed on the interplay with other risk factors, e.g. at the individual level. The focus on marginalisation and discrimination as risk factors harbours a potential for stigmatisation. For example, the high interest of cities in the topic of radicalisation is not always due to concrete problem situations on the ground, but also to the overall social situation. The fight against discrimination and marginalisation should be an important goal of urban policies even without preventive justification.

### *Cross-cutting issues*

The cross-cutting issues (governance and diversification of actors, gender, cyber/technology, transnational/border issues) were only partly discussed at the workshop.

## Gender

For the cooperation in the IcARUS project, it is important to exchange understandings of the topics and possible differences. In the area of gender, for example, everyone has a different understanding of what gender means. This has an impact on the collection of police data (e.g. in relation to domestic violence). This results in the question, for example, of what should be included in the area of gender-based violence and how gender is used as a category. All IcARUS priority areas have a gender component, e.g. radicalisation and security in public space. It is important to understand the gender component of a phenomenon when developing prevention strategies. Gender also plays a role in relation to transnational and cross-border relationships, e.g. the issue of migration has a large gender-specific component. For example, female migrants in cities are at risk differently than male migrants, but also differently than permanent resident women.

The participating cities see gender as an important and broadening issue that they want to integrate into their strategies. Some cities are working with a variety of organisations to address the issue. However, the gender strategies are not always part of the municipal strategies but of individual partnerships, e.g. with specialised NGOs.

## Stakeholders

Local and regional authorities are the focus of the report. The aim of the report was to provide an overview of urban security practises and tools that are adaptable/transferable to the local context. Most cities' urban security strategies are based on a multi-stakeholder approach, oftentimes implemented through formalised partnerships with regards to specific programmes or interventions.

### **2.3 Synergies and divergences between the two reports (D2.1 and D2.2)**

The two reports are based on different time horizons. Academic reports are retrospective, while practices are usually involved in short project periods and therefore tend to be more topical. At the same time, there are also gaps in the inventory of practices, as many practices are not rigorously evaluated. In addition, many innovative practices are not mainstreamed nor sustainably implemented. The main links and divergences between research and practice are discussed below.

## Synergies

In both reports, it is clear that there is a trend toward strengthening resilience, promoting social cohesion, and community engagement. In terms of implementation, the importance of sustainable partnerships between different actors for effective urban security policies and practices is highlighted. However, there is often mistrust/insufficient understanding between different stakeholders and data or information sharing issues.



An important issue in both reports and also in the discussion is the transferability/adaptability of tools, practices, and research findings in relation to the importance of context. Context shapes practices, but does context shape everything? How can experiences and knowledge be transferred from one context to another? There is still a lack of transfer of information. A distinction must be made here between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’. Similarly, the need to understand changing problem situations is emphasised. Both reports point to the need for more evaluation and evidence.

### *Divergences*

The inventory of tools and practices (D2.2) contains more information about digital (online) tools and interventions. This raises questions about innovation and its limits. For example, if innovation and experimentation is encouraged at the edges, but leave common practices untouched. Strategies to promote technological innovation tend to be short-sighted, based on political priorities and short-term funding. The drive for innovation can also lead to reinventing the wheel because institutional memory and learning from research results are weak. Similarly, it can lead to an overemphasis on the importance of context, promoting contextual determinism – ‘it must be invented here’! It is therefore important to combine different types of knowledge: ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’.

## **3 The partner cities’ local security challenges**

Part two of the workshop was organised in parallel breakout sessions. The groupwork focussed on the partner cities’ local security challenges and their further work in the IcARUS project. Each of the six cities presented their local security challenge and engaged in a discussion with the workshop participants to reflect on, reframe and rethink their problem statement. Furthermore, stakeholders relevant to the respective security challenge were collected and mapped (cf. figures 1, 3-7). The mapping allowed not only to further clarify the addressed problem, but also to understand the different perspectives of the actors involved in the field. In order to assess these perspectives, the participants put themselves in the shoes of the chosen stakeholder(s) describing their perspective on the challenge. Concluding the session, city representatives as well as the participants discussed the next steps and reflected on conditions for success and barriers that can arise while addressing and working with stakeholders. The following section describes the main outcome of these sessions for each partner city.

### **3.1 City of Lisbon**

#### **3.1.1 The challenge: Preventing Juvenile Delinquency**

The city of Lisbon, represented by the Lisbon Municipal Police, seeks to prevent juvenile delinquency and antisocial behaviour of local youth.

### *The local context of the challenge*

Young people in particular belonging to some cultural minorities and living in social neighbourhood context are often exposed to life course patterns leading to social exclusion in adulthood. Moreover, there are also conflicts between diverse cultural backgrounds. Furthermore, there is a gender perspective on youth delinquency, since especially boys and young men get more often involved in such behaviour. There are also reports of these young people also defying officers.

Another upcoming problem is conflicts within the community. The pandemic has exacerbated the problem, as many of the relationships that had been built between the youth and the police have broken down.

In the context of community policing in Lisbon, policing in disadvantaged neighbourhoods requires police officers to be able to deal with youth in a positive, rather than repressive, manner. Subsequently, the question is **how to foster positive relationships between police and youngsters in order to promote peaceful coexistence and reduce anti-social-behaviour, and more comprehensively, how to foster positive lifestyles in youth?**

The Lisbon Municipal Police have identified certain **risk factors** in these neighbourhoods:

- Poverty and social exclusion
- Drug and alcohol consumption
- Dysfunctional families
- School failure, truancy and early school leaving
- Isolation (technology dependency)

Exposed to these risk factors are therefore the life paths of the youth as well as the ones of their parents. Consequently, this recurrence can foster a vicious cycle which can be reinforced furthermore by a lack of social contacts and references outside of the respective neighbourhood.

Also in the context of community policing intervention in those neighbourhoods, especially within some cultural minorities, more invisible and worrying realities are revealed through the knowledge of the partnership, such as the example of marriage between youth. This is not only due to the repetition of their parents' lives, but also to the reproduction of gender roles by the mothers of these young women and girls.

Also, the existing mistrust of the police is often reinforced in the family context, as many families have a background of conflict with the police due to administrative infractions, regulatory offences or criminal offenses. The work in partnership between the community policing officers and social partners, such as social workers or community mediators, contributes to jointly address these issues and to gradually improve community-police relations.

### *Countering the challenge*

In Portugal, a distinction can be made between security forces at the national level (National Republican Guard, Public Security and Criminal Investigation Police) and administrative police at the local level (e.g., the Lisbon Municipal Police). However, community policing does not exist in every Lisbon neighbourhood. The Lisbon Municipal Police has developed local multi-agency partnerships (security groups) to jointly plan the introduction of community policing projects. This community policing program is a preventive policing approach planned and implemented by the municipal police in close cooperation with community partnerships. It started in one Lisbon neighbourhood in 2010 (Alta de Lisboa Neighbourhood), and since then it's being gradually expanded to other neighbourhoods of the city.

The Escolhas [Choices] Program from the Migration High Commissioner is a community-driven national program to promote the social inclusion of children and young people from difficult socioeconomic backgrounds, especially with a migrant background and from ethnic minorities (5 projects in Lisbon). This project includes digital introduction centres and works with a peer-to-peer approach through local facilitators. The Safe Schools Program is a national program by the Public Security Police (national police) to promote preventive awareness-raising activities in the school context (e.g., anti-bullying, cyberbullying, dating violence), implemented by national authorities.

**Raising awareness vs. behaviour change:** During the workshop, the awareness raising approach was questioned. Considering that drugs, bullying etc. are still present in schools, the approach should go beyond awareness raising and instead focus on behaviour change. Especially young children who bully are oftentimes themselves victims of violence and bullying.

The Lisbon Municipal Police sees the need for a preventive approach to promote safety behaviour and reduce anti-social behaviour by targeting particularly hard-to-reach groups, such as those from minority communities.

In addition, a bidirectional approach is needed to improve relations between the police and minority communities. For example, there must be a change of perspective from the police to the Roma community and vice versa to reduce prejudices on both sides

The role of intercultural mediators as a link between the police and minority communities is another need identified by the Lisbon Municipal Police.

**Mediation from inside the groups:** During the workshop it was mentioned that the focus could be more on the mediation from inside the groups.


Another identified need is a preventive tool for police work with youngsters, young people, and their families.

**Gender-specific approach:** A gender-specific approach was suggested during the workshop e.g., in cooperation with the Roma women's group to empower the young

women of the community. As the conflicts are mainly perceived as male phenomena, the women are often left in the background of prevention strategies. However, the empowerment of women can probably help to deal with the deeper causes of the conflict.

### 3.1.2 Stakeholder – Mapping

Instead of thinking the police at the head of the cooperation – expressed by a triangle with the municipal police at the top (cf. **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.**, small triangle) and the cooperation partners below, the “inverted triangle” was proposed. The inverted triangle – also known as upside-down triangle – aims at changing the perspective. Rather than perceiving power as top-down, the goal is to think power from the bottom upwards. As a result of this mapping, it is apparent that such a triangle needs not only support to keep up the balance. Everyone must work together in community security partnerships. Hence the inverted triangle is an instrument to keep in mind, that partnerships are central to the approach and that there has to be a balance between the different partners.



**INVERTED TRIANGLE**




Figure 1: Stakeholder-Mapping, city of Lisbon

### 3.1.3 Key take-aways and next steps

#### *Lessons from the review*

“What has been shown to be more effective in preventing juvenile delinquency are all the raise awareness sessions that have been developed in school context. (...) These campaigns are carried out in the classes, from preparatory to secondary education, carrying out awareness about the risks of substance use, bullying, dating violence, etc.” [Police officer interview]

“It makes sense to deconstruct stereotypes by both parties (police officers and young people), in order to break down barriers and prejudices” [Program Choices responsible interview]

- **Police:** The ability to communicate and mediate as well as a constant monitoring by the police are decisive factors in managing risk behaviours.
- **Partnerships:** Local partners are fundamental to signal risk situations to the police and to assist in awareness-raising campaigns.

#### *Lessons from the workshop*

The Lisbon Municipal Police considered the workshop valuable, since it allowed to see that these problems also exist elsewhere in other cities and communities. Furthermore, new insights and other perspectives allowed them to see the issue from a different perspective and to broaden their own perspective. In order to prevent juvenile delinquency and anti-social-behaviour, it is not enough to focus only on the "visible" problems. It was deemed important to broaden the scope of the intervention, aiming the promotion of positive lifestyles in youth (“Rebound forward”). Not only increase youth horizons, but also the scope of the intervention. Concluding the workshop, the aim is now to make a better community, with the youth’s positive and active contribution.

## 3.2 City of Nice

### 3.2.1 The challenge: Securing Nice’s public spaces in a terrorist context

The challenge the city of Nice wants to address is burglaries in residential parts of the city including the increase of this phenomenon in peak seasons due to the high touristic attractiveness of the city. Besides, the city is limited in its possibilities of intervention as it is also facing the challenge to find immediate solutions to improve the security of public spaces in a terrorist context, without overly securitising public space or “transforming the city into a bunker”.

#### *The local context of the challenge*

The City of Nice was hit by two terrorist attacks in the years 2016 and 2020. The first attack, a ram attack, occurred on 14 July in 2016 on the *Promenade des Anglais*, where people were celebrating the National Day, causing 87 victims mostly children and more than 500 injured



people. Four years later, on 29 October 2020 the *Basilique de Notre-Dame* was the target of another attack.

Northern Nice is known for its popular squares and markets, it is also the part where is located one of the Universities, and it is a residential area. The city of Nice has 400,000 inhabitants; the population is older than the national average.

The city of Nice has been involved in fighting crime and promoting a sense of security by investing in the last technologies, by trying to develop innovative ways to secure public spaces and by recruiting the largest police force in France.

**Perception of security:** During the workshop, several levels of the perception of safety by local authorities and the fear of crime were distinguished. Since there is not necessarily a correspondence between reality, actions, and the perception of security.




Figure 2: Feeling of insecurity

The information was obtained with the application “Allo Mairie”, where complaints, needs of interventions, but also offences are reported. This makes it possible to obtain information on the level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction of the users. A survey was also conducted on the use of video surveillance technologies and on the feeling about facial recognition tools.

### Countering the challenge

To prevent terrorist attacks, but also to tackle other forms of crime, the city of Nice has implemented various measures in different areas:

- Securing public roads: anti intrusion barriers, custom made equipment for public spaces, Centre of Urban Supervision, emergency calls
- Safe schools: Video surveillance, presence of public order agents (agents de surveillance de la voie publique, ASVP), alert buttons, prevention work
- Public spaces: Emergency calls, alert buttons, Neighbourhood watch network, video protection, drones, prevention workshops

At first aimed to prevent crimes, there is now a decrease in the request for new cameras. Hence, the cameras installed in the city of Nice can also have an impact on the feeling of safety, as people feel safer as a result.

**Limits in cameras utility concerning perception of security:** However, it was mentioned during the workshop, that cameras will never replace human intervention and the necessary contact between the citizens and the police officers to provide a perception of security.

France has a national asset with the training and implementation of police officers squad dedicated to situational prevention. The city of Nice has developed for long situational prevention squad, which means that police officers are trained to think like burglars, observe the situation, check the vulnerabilities of public places, and propose free audits of vulnerable places. The problem, however, is that the implementation of the recommendations may be costly.

The city of Nice is working to develop partnership with the private spaces in order to connect their network of cameras to the Urban Surveillance Centre that will become in a few years an 'hyper surveillance centre' with the creation of the Saint Roch Police Headquarters.

As part of the Neighbourhood Watch, many meetings have been organised to train citizens on how to respond in case of insecurity. These recommendations are shared through the network.

In order to reach the goals of its challenge, the city of Nice seeks to:

- share and improve its knowledge, technologies and experiences in urban security
- find innovative and efficient solutions to improve urban security of public places.

### 3.2.2 Stakeholder – Mapping

The city of Nice is part of other European projects such as *Pactesur* as well as the co-coordinator of the EU's *Urban Agenda* partnership for security in public spaces and seeks to develop continuously an international network. Furthermore, the city tries to pool processes that have been developed elsewhere.

The question that came up during the mapping is how to reduce the risk of burglaries? This question was guiding the mapping (cf.

#### The implementation of solutions

- In what ways might we support citizens in securing their homes against burglary? By supporting citizens actions, police crime prevention recommendations.
- In what ways might we ensure security of homes against burglary?
- In what ways might we increase the implementation of police crime prevention recommendations?






Figure 3: Stakeholder-Mapping, city of Nice

### 3.2.3 Key take-aways and next steps

#### *Lessons from the reviews*

- Situational prevention: recognition that the incidence of crime can be affected by situational measures through modifications to the immediate physical environment in which crimes occur
- A partnership approach: The recognition that in its design and implementation urban security demands collaboration through multi-stakeholder responses and that the police alone cannot prevent crime
- A preventive design mentality: The awareness of ‘up-stream’ design-thinking and early interventions that seek to anticipate harm and pre-empt criminal opportunities by effecting social and technological change rather than retrofitting solutions after the event
- Crime prevention through environmental design: the recognition that design modifications to the built environment can foster reductions in the incidence and the fear of crime.

#### *Lessons from the workshop*

The workshop made it possible to narrow down the problem: The problem is how we make public spaces safe and how do we consider different domains, such as terrorist attacks, but also daily criminality and find out how to address the feeling of insecurity of a specific group of people in a specific space in the city of Nice. Securing public spaces in a terrorist context has become an everyday issue and is not only necessary at the moment of terrorism. The IcARUS project shows that the city of Nice is not alone in its battle, we all have the same problems. This is also a key take away for the city of Nice.

## 3.3 City of Riga

### 3.3.1 The challenge: Designing and managing safe public spaces

The city of Riga – represented by the Riga Municipal Police (RMP) wants to work on mechanisms to monitor phenomena relevant to security in the city centre, with the aim to improve the design and management of public space and better inform policing. Central to this aim is the analysis of a range of data such as police statistics, crime and victimisation surveys, data collected by public institutions such as departments of the city administration or mobility service providers, or by private institutions such as businesses or private security services.

### *The local context of the challenge*

As a central stakeholder in the provision of urban security management, RMP work with a wide range of relevant data sets that are mined and analysed in order to better plan measures of policing and crime prevention in public spaces. However, there are challenges around the analysis and usability of data for the concrete planning of such measures. One example in this regard is the use of survey data on the perceptions of security of inhabitants. Two such surveys have been commissioned by the city of Riga recently, and have shown inconclusive results on individual perceptions of neighbourhood safety and risks in public space. While in a survey with 2166 respondents conducted in 2021 over 80% had indicated they were satisfied with their personal and home safety in Riga, only slightly more than half of the 700 respondents of another survey conducted the same year said they felt that they could trust the people in their neighbourhood. This and other examples have raised questions around how survey data should be understood, how their knowledge gain can be measured, and how they can be combined with crime statistics and other datasets in order to define priorities in public space and inform the planning of policing and other public services.

### *Countering the challenge*

In a deliberative process with the project partners, members of the expert advisory board and the consultative committee of cities, the RMP representatives further elaborated on their challenges and explained that their main aim was to improve their capacity to evaluate and interpret relevant data in a structured way that corresponded to the needs of their institution. Following this discussion, which sought to recontextualise and reframe the initial problem statement, the challenge was formulated as a question which can guide the further research work to be done within the IcARUS project:

*In what ways might we gather and understand data to assess risks in public spaces and neighbourhoods of Riga in order to improve the effectiveness of policing?*

### **3.3.2 Stakeholder – Mapping**

In a mapping exercise relevant stakeholder were identified and located in the following graph (cf. Figure 4: Stakeholder-Mapping, city of Riga).


A further exercise, aiming to change the perspective and perceive of the challenge from the standpoint of some of the identified stakeholders, revealed that they hold different perceptions of security in public space, may have different interests and concerns with regard to security data, and may play different roles in the gathering and analysis of such data. For example:

The urban development department is a key stakeholder for such an effort and an essential contributor. It has important intelligence to provide as well as a vital interest in the outcomes of such an analysis. It will want to be involved and to have certain degree of control over the

process, however, may have very limited resources to commit. Its approach to the endeavour will likely be a bureaucratic one, and the participation of the department will have to respect its internal processes.

Universities can also be relevant stakeholders, particularly those with programmes on security policy or security management, with social science programmes and departments, and those with a research focus. Universities may have methodological competencies in the processing of relevant data and monitoring urban security, which they can contribute to the challenge. They may equally have further interests in such processes, e.g. as they seek to keep students safe on campus, involve students in research, or use the research results for their own teaching or academic work.

A night club manager may also be a stakeholder with a potentially important contribution to make: They may, via their employees and customers, have intimate knowledge about security risks at night and in the areas around their businesses. They may also be interested in contributing to a process that involves police and the city administration in order to assure a safe environment for their business, their employees and customers. Also, contributing to the management of public security research may be a way for them to improve their reputation and build collaborative ties with a network of institutions.



### 3.3.3 Key Take-aways and next steps

#### *Lessons from the reviews*

- “...some looked simply at the crime rates pre- and post-intervention and determined their conclusion based on any significant increase or decrease (or lack thereof).”
- “...to measure perceptions of safety – specifically how safe a community felt using public spaces, even if this differed from statistical crime rates.”
- “...we must first understand the priorities of a public space.”

#### *Lessons from the workshop*

The city of Riga identified more stakeholders in public spaces (e.g. gardeners of public spaces, have a new perspective).

The Riga Municipal Police are currently planning and preparing a workshop with local stakeholders scheduled for the month of June 2022. The workshop will seek to gather relevant actors from Riga to involve them in the discussions around the challenge and give them the opportunity to input and engage in the problem statement and, consecutively and by way of further planned local workshops in the course of WP 3, to partake in the search of solutions.



## 3.4 City of Rotterdam

### 3.4.1 The challenge: Organised crime and trafficking related to public space

#### *The local context of the challenge*

The huge business parc in Rotterdam, Spaanse polder, was neglected by the authorities over a long period of time. As a result, the Spaanse polder became a breeding ground for subversive organised crime. The first steps as restoring order and reshaping the landscape are underway since 2014 (Holsteiner approach) and process of exchange and working with local stakeholders has been initiated and will continue.

The Holsteiner approach started in 2014 and is known for its multidisciplinary and integral approach. The mainly repressive approach focusses on judicial, administrative, and fiscal aspects on tackling organised and subversive crime. The municipalities of Rotterdam and Schiedam are therefore closely working together with the Tax and Customs Administration, the Rotterdam police unit, the Public Prosecution Service (OM) and the FIOD with a focus on specific rogue branches that are sheltered in the area. Additionally, the physical reshaping of the landscape is of the core aspects of the approach.

#### *Countering the challenge*

The Holsteiner-approach (2014) has been fruitful to a large extent but in order to tackle the wicked problem in 'Spaanse Polder' even more the goal and challenge is not only to find an integrated approach to minimise opportunities for subversive crime, but also to achieve this by promoting social cohesion in the business park. This is even more difficult as there are no residents living in the area. Therefore, the municipality is closely working together (local) entrepreneurs, stakeholders, and councils within the business district of Spaanse Polder. Strengthening the social structure is focused on two **needs**:

1. The stimulation of social cohesion on a business park with no inhabitants.
2. The creation of a relevant social structure in the area where entrepreneurs and local authorities share the same goals.

### 3.4.2 Stakeholders

The city of Rotterdam has the political support for this challenge. In addition, the local authorities and the LEAs are now working together on a structured basis to fight subversive crime in the area. Furthermore, the municipality of Rotterdam is linked to a group of entrepreneurs.

### 3.4.3 Key Take-aways and next steps

#### *Lessons from the review*

- The value of multi-agency partnership
- Repressive measures have their boundaries
- Know your position as (local) authority in the battle against subversive crime
- Failure and undesired side effects are as important as learning about success
- Don't focus in the search for the silver bullet






Figure 5: Stakeholder-Mapping, city of Rotterdam

## 3.5 City of Stuttgart

### 3.5.1 The challenge: Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

The city of Stuttgart seeks to prevent radicalisation at a very early stage and targets youth referring to 11 – 18-year-olds.

#### *The local context of the challenge*

The crime statistics in Stuttgart show comparatively low rates for many types of crime, but the majority of society still develops a feeling of insecurity. This discrepancy was highlighted by a recent survey.

**Wording is crucial:** During the workshop it was mentioned that people tend to answer that they do not feel safe if you ask them about their general feeling. However, if you ask them about a specific situation where they felt unsafe, they often cannot name one.

**Improving the communication:** Maybe the communication about the city's crime prevention and urban security policy is not good enough. An idea suggested during the workshop was an improved communication of the city about what has already been done.

In recent years, new ideological formations have emerged on the basis of which people can radicalise, in addition to those already existing (right-wing, left-wing, Islamist extremism). Considering the public movements against infection control measures in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic ("Querdenker") and the violent youth riots in the summer of 2020, it can be concluded that various forms of radicalisation came to the surface. These youth riots and the "Querdenker"-scene could have the same reasons so there could also be an invisible radicalisation, that may not be detected by monitoring mechanisms such as the reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Verfassungsschutz*).

#### *Countering the challenge*

Since deradicalisation and tertiary prevention is already the focus of another department in Stuttgart, the goal is rather a primary approach of prevention and an early intervention, since radicalisation is often noted too late and the only option left is deradicalisation.

The goal is to search for the root of radicalisation and to start early with prevention. However, only school children are considered as a target group, because they can be addressed via school. The radicalisation of older people is not easy to address, as there is less knowledge on this more recent phenomenon.

The City of Stuttgart aims to prevent radicalisation in society, to strengthen cohesion, to stop polarisation and to promote togetherness. In order to achieve that, they want to reach as many people as possible and to start as early as possible, by developing tools for schoolteachers and

parents. Currently, the city of Stuttgart works with two teachers (at the moment) at one school and the administration.

**Include social workers and street-workers:** In order to assess the phenomenon another suggestion during the workshop was to also include social workers and street-workers and to compare the answers of social workers and teachers.

Up to now an online questionnaire has been developed, but it is still too extensive and will be shortened to 15 to 20 questions. It was a challenge to develop the questions and to distinguish between rebellion, typical 'youth behaviour' and radicalisation.

The questionnaire was developed with teachers and in collaboration with the statistical office. It is aiming an age group starting at the 5<sup>th</sup> grade (age of 11-12). The goal is to identify areas for action to develop a suitable tool.

### 3.5.2 Stakeholder – Mapping

There is already a good pre-existing collaboration of the city of Stuttgart with many of the stakeholders involved. The city's crime prevention manager is a police officer who is seconded to the city hall and assures a close cooperation between the mayor's office and the police.

A good connection and trust have already been established by the city of Stuttgart with several different stakeholders:

- the **department of youth** (a very important partner)
- the **juvenile justice services** (*Jugendgerichtshilfe*)
- the **department of integration** (already existing collaboration and coordination will prevent the city of Stuttgart to reinvent the wheel)
- the **schools** and the responsible **administration** (This is already a big step, since it is always a challenge to convince the administration)

Other stakeholders already serve as counselling partners such as the FEX (Expert advice centre for the prevention of extremism), the KONEX (the Regional Competence Centre against Extremism) and the Social Counselling Association of Stuttgart.




Figure 6: Stakeholder-Mapping, city of Stuttgart



### 3.5.3 Key take-aways and next steps

#### *Lessons from the review*

- Establish functioning networks, partnership approaches, cross-system networks
- Growing awareness for early intervention
- Groundwork (conduct expert monitoring and project monitoring)
- Sharing and linking data within networks, transport information to the network
- Work transparently
- Promote investment in prevention
- Promote trust relationships with urban society and within organizations
- Make citizens aware of risks, increase sensitivity

#### *Lessons from the workshop*

##### Identified barriers and difficulties

- Early (primary) prevention is a process and not an easy outcome/impact to measure, because it will be a softer outcome. It is hard to sell that politically.
- All local partners have their institutional logics and professional perspectives, as well as expectations and definitions.
- A good communication should be ensured with all local partners.

##### New ideas and strategies

**Other sources of inspiration:** Austria has been funding initiatives and projects for workshops at schools in order to prevent extremism.

**Inclusion of humanitarian values in the curriculum:** Policy makers should include humanitarian values in the curriculum. For instance, social theatre is an opportunity to debate about controversial subjects.

**Labelling and framing are important:** It would be advisable to frame the interventions as empowerment. This should not only be considered for the communication but also for the conducted survey.

## 3.6 City of Turin

### 3.6.1 The challenge: Preventing Juvenile Delinquency

In order to prevent juvenile delinquency, the Turin Municipal Police seek to address young people, i.e., pre-adolescents and adolescents up to the age of 18 and young adults. Additionally, they now also target children in their first 1,000 days of life. This prevention is necessary because the city of Turin experiences spontaneous aggregations of young people the media calls “*baby gangs*”.

#### *The local context of the challenge*

National data show that 6.5 % of the minors are members of such a group and that 16 % have already committed anti-social behaviour such as vandalism. The number of minors and young adults placed in juvenile detention centres in 2020 was 713 out of approximately 30,000 reported cases (source: National Adolescence Observatory). Of particular concern is the young age of the members of these groups, as well as the violence within them. Characteristic of these groups is their non-structured but fluid nature, as well as an aesthetic component of expression, as these crimes are often filmed and disseminated in the media. High unemployment rates, families with economic difficulties, but also identity problems and high school dropout rates are mentioned as causes for these problems.

#### *Countering the challenge*

Minors should become aware of the effects and harm of their behaviour in order to reduce the risk of re-offending. Young people have a low level of understanding of misbehaviour but a high level of indifference towards violence. Additionally, young people should change their perception of police officers as people who can help them improve their lives.

The city of Turin has already taken measures in primary and secondary prevention to address this challenge:

- Job placement (orientation), to counter early school leaving
- Awareness programs (school, families)
- Tackling educational poverty (families)
- Promoting youth protagonism (Youth Protagonism Centres)
- Promoting space of aggregation: indoor (Neighbourhood Houses) or outdoor

Turin’s local prevention policy promotes a restorative justice approach, with *social utility* as well as *mediation* activities that aim to involve the community and to strengthen social cohesion:

- Education and self-responsibilities of the minor offender
- Reparation of the offense
- Recognition and tackling exploitation of victims



Despite the various measures taken by the Turin Municipal Police to address this challenge and despite the tools developed and the networks in place, the challenge is still there.

**Redefine the challenge:** During the workshop it was mentioned that the real reason why the tools implemented do not work 100 %, is due to the fact, that the police do not know the dynamics of the groups of concern. Hence, the aim is to deepen the understanding of these group dynamics collecting more data on the field. By a wider understanding of this phenomenon, the city of Turin should then be able to address prevention policies in a more efficient and effective way.

**Assessing the problem:** The city should develop an impact assessment methodology and indicators that are able to provide data on changes over time in a defined time window.

**Merging of qualitative with quantitative data:** Qualitative data often cannot be compared with quantitative data due to the lack of long-term evaluation. The city of Turin has some initiatives regarding the perception of safety in some areas of the city where they have a platform for citizen participation.

### 3.6.2 Stakeholder – Mapping

Within the Piedmont Region 24 regional guidance offices are offering a free service of information, advice and accompaniment for youngsters between 12 and 22 who wish to enrol in secondary schools, training courses to the university and other post-graduate courses. The city of Turin offers further opportunities to young people living in its area through the *Turin Work Centre*, the *Youth Protagonism Centres* and *network of neighbourhood houses*. Churches provide 11 job information centres and 44 listening centre that offer hospitality, listening and guidance for people in social need. The NGOs have several projects aimed at combating early school dropout, unemployment and promoting juvenile protagonism and active citizenship. Street and community education which is the operational arm of the NGOs, promotes educational, animation and prevention activities for youth and adults, which are an element of community empowerment.

The main stakeholders identified for the primary and secondary level of prevention are:

- Piedmont Region
- City of Turin
- Churches
- NGOs
- Street and Community educational
- Proximity Police Unit (Local Police)

As long as the tertiary level of prevention is concerned the main stakeholders are:

- the Proximity Police Unit (Local Police)
- the Juvenile Prosecutor's Office




Figure 7: Stakeholder-Mapping, city of Turin



### 3.6.3 Key Take-aways and next steps

#### *Lessons from the review*

##### Primary and secondary prevention

- Youth empowerment through the methodology of youth protagonism is a key element for prevention
- Countering early school leaving
- Low level of youth perception of wrongdoing and high level of indifference to violence and injustice
- Lack of operational continuity for some structures
- Stabilization of occupational profiles
- Difficulties on political impact

##### Tertiary prevention

- The importance of the preventive approach also at the investigative level
- Lack of awareness and operational training on the application of the restorative justice approach
- The importance of improving the perception of the role of police officers in adolescent groups

#### *Lessons from the workshop*

The Turin Municipal Police explained that a deeper understanding of the phenomenon was lacking and that they need to know their public spaces.

**Broader list of stakeholders:** For example, cinema owners and shop owners should not only be informed about the city's strategy, but their perspective should also be included.

**Communication of the challenge:** Journalists should promote a “positive communication” of the challenge, by stressing the importance of preventive policies instead of repression policies.

**Improving the involvement of families and foreign descents:** During the implementation process youngsters and families should be better involved in the programs and the communication with foreign descents should be improved.

The city also wants to include qualitative data through interviews with a psychologist. However, there is the question of ethics as it is sensitive data and there is the question of how to involve young people. Impact assessment is a challenge for existing and new tools and the construction of appropriate indicators.

#### *Next steps*

1. The City of Turin will contact stakeholders they still have to get in touch with.
2. In order to establish the infrastructural assessment, the City of Turin will start engaging with the NGOs and with schools and teachers.

## 4 Reflections on transfer and implementation

The third section of this report addresses questions of transfer and adaptation of knowledge with a view to the implementation of urban security policies and programmes. Per Grant Agreement, a central aim of task 2.3 was “the identification of specific requirements” as well as to “contribute to the discussion of what works well and what needs to be adapted/improved and developed”.

Drawing from the discussions at the third part of the workshop, this section seeks to interrogate more closely the notions of transfer and implementation in urban security planning and for IcARUS. Concretely, the three following questions were addressed at the workshop and are elaborated on here:

- What are key considerations when we seek to conceive the implementation of urban security measures?
- What are requirements and criteria for successful implementation processes?
- How do we seek to organise the transfer between research and implementation for the IcARUS project?

In the following, each of these questions is addressed in a separate sub-section.

### 4.1 Reflections on implementation in urban security practice

Research matters and is a key resource for urban security policy today. Especially practice-oriented research is much needed – rigorous scientific analysis of urban security programmes and projects can help us learn from past successes and failures. It can deepen our understanding of what has or has not worked where, when, why and how. It can inform and improve how we do urban security today and help us shape and innovate what we will do in the future. The workshop has, as laid out in part one of this report, organised a critical review enabling practitioners to engage with the state-of-the-art report and practice collection. Practitioners have not only provided their feedback, but also mined the reports in a structured process for key outcomes that correspond to their daily practice. This way of proceeding sought to foster an uptake of the research results and lessons learnt by the practitioners in the partner cities as well as by other partners of the IcARUS project.

However, the relationship between research and practice is complex. While research seeks to systematically study a field of knowledge to establish common facts or abstract principles, practice is situated in concrete social contexts and must navigate a complex field of sometimes conflicting interests, limited resources and often incongruent expectations.

To conceive of such practice and situate it in the design thinking methodology developed for IcARUS, the notion of implementation is key. Implementation can be understood as

*“... the carrying out of planned, intentional activities that aim to turn evidence and ideas into policies and practices that work for people in the*

*real world. It is about putting a plan into action; the 'how' as well as the 'what'.*<sup>1</sup>

At the workshop, a roundtable entitled 'Implementation of urban security programmes - experiences, conditions for success and challenges', brought together speakers from the IcARUS consortium and beyond to discuss key aspects of implementation in urban security practice. During the exchange, the following key considerations were formulated that fundamentally shape processes of implementation and must be kept in mind for the further activities in the IcARUS project:

#### *Local context matters*

Each city and region is a unique entity with a distinct historical, cultural, political and social life of their own. While national and supranational contexts and frameworks shape the institutional and administrative realities of local and regional authorities, each urban agglomeration develops its own specificities and singularities. They are unique entities; their processes and realities are shaped by path dependencies and individual developments that are not easily grasped by outsiders.

This general observation on the nature of life in cities and regions applies to the policy fields of urban security, policing and crime prevention: The responsibilities for the provision of urban security tasks, for example, differ significantly depending on regional and national contexts. While in some countries police tasks are taken over centrally by the state, in others they are in the hands of the regions, and in still others at the local level. Similarly, cities and regions take on very different tasks in public welfare and the provision of social services. Municipalities are structured differently from city to city and have different mandates and responsibilities in relation to the prevention of violence and crime. They are confronted with different challenges in the field of urban security, their financial and human resources differ significantly from one another, and the networks of associations and initiatives with which they can cooperate have developed and are anchored very unevenly locally. The priorities that cities and regions set in preventing and combating violence, and which crime phenomena they focus on in particular, depend on local circumstances and histories. Moreover, the experiences that local communities have had with law enforcement, city administrations, and other prevention actors can shape how prevention programmes are viewed and perceived today.

Such specific local contexts, opportunities and capacities must be taken into account as they determine the success or failure of implementation. If they are not sufficiently considered, the stakeholders involved will have difficulties anticipating the effects of their actions and will not

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<sup>1</sup> [The Centre for Effective Services, CES Guide to Implementation](#)

be able to influence the social ecosystems into which they intervene according to their objectives.

#### *Implementation is a form of design*

If we understand implementation to mean the carrying out of planned, intentional activities that aim to turn evidence and ideas into policies and practices that work for people in the real world, then knowing what has worked elsewhere can only be a starting point.

We can look closely at measures that have produced good results in other places and draw inspiration from them - but we cannot assume that we will achieve the same results if we adopt them and transfer them to our local context. Rather than reproducing an established format, implementation requires a design process. As laid out in the design thinking methodology established for the IcARUS project, such a process consists of different phases that can encompass empathising with users, defining problems, ideating solutions, prototyping ideas and testing prototypes (see D1.2, p. 6). It enables the constant reframing and rethinking of our challenges or problem statements, allows us to change viewpoints and incorporate differing perspectives, and lets us adapt and further develop our measures in crime prevention and urban security during implementation.

When we refer to design here, we do not only understand design as a process to produce a product or artefact, but as a way to collaboratively create new social conditions in cities and regions. IcARUS seeks to establish and promote such a collaborative methodology in a wide European network of urban security providers, thereby fostering an innovative approach to urban security.

#### *Innovation arises from implementation*

Innovation, i.e. the emergence of new social practices that help us better meet human needs and address societal challenges, is a complex process. Innovation can encompass a variety of dimensions, among which social/societal, technological, economic, behavioural or juridical aspects. While technologies can play a crucial part in innovation, we should not equate the two, as the look to new technologies can prevent us from recognising and valuing other dimensions of innovation.

Innovation rests on a variety of features, among which:

- Divergence, i.e. the ability to challenge the status quo, think and act in ways that are uncommon, and question our assumptions;
- Curiosity, i.e. the desire to discover the unknown, find new ideas and perspectives, and question what we see and do;
- Teamwork, i.e. the capacity to work in diverse, versatile teams that bring together different perspectives, disciplines and experiences; and

- Resilience, i.e. the skill to experiment, analyse your experience, tweak and improve your ideas and bounce back from failure.<sup>2</sup>

So essentially, if we understand implementation as a process of turning evidence and ideas into policies and practices, we can value its potentials for fostering innovation in concrete local contexts, regardless of whether a project or programme we implement has taken inspiration from a practice that is well established and tested elsewhere.

#### *Collaboration is the backbone of implementation*

In the vast majority of cases, the implementation of urban security programmes is not carried out by a city administration or an agency commissioned by it alone. Even if there are central responsibilities for the implementation of programmes in the administration or in independent providers, they always need the input and cooperation of a broad network of prevention actors and, last but not least, of the inhabitants of our cities and regions, who are the end users of many measures. The uptake, ownership and collaboration of such wider networks can thus be seen as the backbone of successful implementation.

However, collaboration is not a simple concept. We can understand collaboration as a continuum that starts with basic forms of consultation or incentivised participation that do not lend those consulted any noticeable or lasting influence on the common process and thus tend to perpetuate exclusion, powerlessness and anger, fear and scarcity. More robust forms of collaboration encompass the co-creation of processes, constant feedback-loops, partnership and shared ownership. Such more robust forms of collaboration assure that all voices are heard and everyone is useful, convey a shared vision and mutual respect, and can foster resilient communities. At the end of the continuum, there are forms of collaboration that are characterised by a sharing power and leadership. They are marked by courage and creativity and enable innovation and sustainable change.

Reflecting on forms and processes of collaboration is thus key to designing and implementing urban security programmes and lies at the heart of such endeavours.

#### *Projects and programmes are learning organisms*

Finally, it is important to understand implementation as a process of learning, adapting and developing. The IcARUS partners agreed that prevention programmes and projects can be successful and sustainable if they have the opportunity to develop over a longer period of time, to learn from their own mistakes and to adapt to changing conditions. In order to enable such development processes, resources are needed: the actors need spaces in which they can exchange ideas with each other, reflect on their processes and their impact, including

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<sup>2</sup>[See UNHCR Innovation Service, Why innovation and technology aren't the same](#)



unexpected or unintended effects, and develop ideas and recommendations for changing or supplementing their measures.

On the one hand, time resources are needed for such processes; on the other hand, forms of scientific monitoring and evaluation can contribute to creating spaces in which reflections can take place and be supported. Such resources should be provided for in implementation processes from the outset.

Moreover, to understand collective learning, the concepts of institutional and informal knowledge are also important. Institutional knowledge comprises collected and shared knowledge of a group of people or an organisation. Informal knowledge arises in learning processes that are not intended as such but occur as part of the practice quasi incidentally and inadvertently. Such forms of knowledge are often not considered, but can make an important contribution to project implementation.

## **4.2 Criteria and conditions for successful implementation**

Apart from the aforementioned key considerations and principles, the speakers and project partners also discussed a number of criteria and conditions for the successful implementation of urban security programmes. The absence of such conditions, it was noted, can pose severe challenges to such processes and hamper their success. The following were considered the most important:

### *Trust and mutual respect between stakeholders*

Implementing urban security initiatives and programmes requires the cooperation of a wide range of stakeholders – elected officials, representatives of different departments within the local administration, LEA officers, NGOs, local communities to name a few. As they come to urban security production with different sets of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, trust and mutual respect between these different groups of contributors is not a given. Sometimes conflicting interests, differing outlooks, or historical experiences of disenfranchisement can be sources of mistrust or general scepticism. Concrete opportunities of contact and exchange, such as multi stakeholder training sessions or other forms of gatherings can help foster positive experiences of cooperation and develop a culture of mutual trust and respect.

### *Diverse and multidisciplinary prevention networks*

The successful implementation of urban security initiatives requires the integration of a variety of perspectives and competencies, knowledge sets and methodologies. In particular, it was formulated that not only police and criminological expertise is needed, but also sociological, psychological, medical, socio-educational and other approaches in order to implement comprehensive prevention programmes. Such interdisciplinarity is not always present in local networks, especially in smaller cities, because the number of cooperating actors is smaller and the diversity of professional approaches is lower. Recruiting staff with diverse professional qualifications for prevention work is therefore a condition for success in programme



implementation and at the same time a challenge that municipalities and regions are confronted with.

#### *Motivational leadership from elected officials*

Politicians can play a key role for the implementation of urban security programmes, notably in providing clear leadership and a motivational approach. As elected representatives, they have a particular public legitimacy to represent local prevention networks in public debates. In order to assure a long-term commitment to prevention work, their leadership and representation function is important. To be able to assume such a role well, it is central that elected representatives, on the one hand, exchange closely with their administrative staff, who have the technical expertise and coordinate the municipal programmes on a day-to-day basis. On the other hand, it is important to have the opportunity to exchange with peers from other cities and regions to reflect on one's own role and activities and to learn from the experiences of others.

#### *Continuous and feasible quality management*

Establishing a quality management process is key to successful implementation. Are the set aims achieved? Are the contributing stakeholders satisfied with the implemented processes and their outcomes? Are undesired developments and outcomes detected and addressed? Basic quality management measures should be implemented to make sure such questions are addressed and the success of the implementation process is constantly monitored. Such quality management measures should be feasible, i.e. they should not overburden the responsible stakeholders or divest too many resources from the implementations process. The field of approaches, procedures and methodologies in project evaluation is large, and it is not easy for non-experts to orient themselves in this field. However, when chosen wisely and performed continuously, quality management, evaluation and monitoring can significantly strengthen an initiative and foster its sustainability over the long term.

#### *Connecting online and offline spaces*

Online spaces have significantly increased in relevance for the lives in our cities. Virtual networks and platforms can no longer be seen as a world apart, but are intricately interwoven and connected with our lives outside of these realms. Online forums engender their own forms of polarisation and radicalisation, violence and delinquency, and these spill over and produce effects in the lives of people outside these forums. However, social networks in particular have now also given rise to their own approaches to prevention work, which take up methods of social work and pedagogy and adapt them to the communication conditions of different platforms.

When implementing urban security initiatives, these interconnections between online and offline spaces should be taken into account, and their relevance should be thought through for any given implementation process.

#### *Long-term initiatives and project cycles*

Much has been said about the short-lived nature of many prevention projects and programmes. Public attention for phenomena of crime and violence in urban settings is volatile, and political

commitment to addressing security-related challenges depends on electoral processes, majorities and their political priorities. However, for the successful implementation of urban security initiatives, long-term perspectives are key. In order to be able to adapt a given programme to a local context, to implant it with the local stakeholders and communities and enable a sustainable uptake and engagement, time is a crucial enabling factor. Political commitment and funding must respect sensible planning intervals that allow for a stable development of a programme, its thoughtful adaptation to local contexts, resources and specificities, and for learning and improvement as an integral part of an implementation process.

#### *Speaking a common language*

Lastly, it is important that the actors involved in the implementation of measures can learn to speak a common language. Many terms and concepts that play a central role in violence prevention and urban security are complex and can be interpreted in different ways. Terms such as radicalisation, juvenile delinquency, organised crime or the management of public spaces can be understood differently from different organisational or disciplinary perspectives. If there are different interpretations of terms, this is not always immediately apparent in practice, but only becomes evident later in the implementation process, when assessments and interpretations of the achievement of objectives or the impacts of the project work reveal them. Here it can help to work together on terminology at an early stage and to develop shared definitions. As in the case of IcARUS, these can be set down as a glossary of central terms that can support the project work.

### **4.3 Organising knowledge transfer within IcARUS**

Finally, the workshop has also sought to foster further reflection on how the transfer of knowledge from the research phase to the toolkit development and implementation phases can be organised concretely. The research carried out in the framework of IcARUS dealt on the one hand with a State-of-the-Art Review of the accumulated research knowledge base (Task 2.1) of prevention research in urban contexts, i.e. a systematic overview and evaluation of the research on the four focus areas of urban security dealt with in the project. On the other hand, an Inventory of Tools and Practices (Task 2.2) was carried out that looks at prevention practice and systematically presents how cities and regions in Europe implement urban security strategies, what their priorities and approaches are, and where they see potential for further development. From the outset, this research has taken an approach that emphasises usability in practice: The results were presented in a condensed, particularly accessible way, for example in the form of overviews, principles or axioms that can directly inspire practice and inform the implementation of projects and programmes.

In order to better identify which findings resulting from the research are relevant to the practice of the project partners and which they can relate to particularly intensively, all workshop participants dealt with them in advance of the event, mined them for aspects that are of particular relevance to them and their respective field of work, and all explained with examples how they can work with and use the reports in their everyday life. These examples were

presented and discussed in the plenary sessions and breakout groups, and are included in the previous sections of this report.

Importantly in this regard, the workshop has included a session of collective work to design a roadmap, which has fed into the development of deliverable D 2.4 "Roadmap for the Improvement and Definition of Tools". The Roadmap seeks to draw out from the descriptive findings of the two reviews key prescriptive principles, constraints and guidance that focus on the practical question of: what should be done? It assembles advice on aspects of problem identification, the establishment of partnerships, design and innovation, implantation and outcomes, evaluation and communication for the overall project development, and also encompasses specific guidance on the four focus areas. The roadmap thus sets out clear principles and recommendations that can systematically structure and innovate further work within the IcARUS project, and beyond that, the practice of designing, planning and implementing urban security projects and programmes of European cities as a whole.

In addition to these reflections on the project as a whole and in the plenary, the workshop also provided an opportunity to think more concretely about the next steps of implementation in the partner cities. Following the stakeholder mapping, concrete agreements were made in the breakout groups on how to organise the first local workshops (Task 3.1: "Local workshops with civil society to create a cross-priority analysis") and what the central methodological and content-related aspects of these events should be. These workshops will bring together for the first time the local stakeholders in the six cities, who will be involved in the work on the selected challenges in the further course, in order to engage them in the problem framing and to familiarise them with the project methodology of design thinking as well as the roadmap for further action. The roadmap is also to be further revised and adapted as well as validated within the framework of these events, if necessary, in order to ensure once again in this process that the principles and axioms developed correspond to the needs of practice and can be continuously reflected upon and expanded by the practitioners.

Another outcome of the workshop is that those project partners who have worked with the cities on their challenges in the breakout groups and have thus already dealt intensively with their questions and planning should also work with the cities in the further course of the project and accompany their process. It may not always be possible for them to be involved in the local events, but a constant flow of information between the cities and the respective partners should be ensured. This can be another way to secure the results developed in WP 2 "Review and cross-analysis of urban security" and to continuously feed them into the work of the following WPs 3 "Toolkit development using social and technological innovation" and 4 "Toolkit demonstration and implementation".

## 5 Conclusion

The workshop has provided ample opportunity to present and discuss the key outcomes of WP2's research work amongst the partners. The sessions and formats were designed to foster reflections on the relevance of the research for participants, on the transfer of knowledge between research and practice generally and between IcARUS work packages more specifically, and on the concrete next steps for the project.

Part one, the review of the research reports D2.1 and D2.2 showed that scientific evidence is of increasing relevance for urban security policy, and that significant progress has been made in academic as well as practice-oriented research over the last 30 years. The state of evidence differs significantly among the project's focus areas, and there is a number of factors – time lags and differing temporalities, sometimes disparate scopes and logics, incompatible views of relevant and usable data and a divergent view of the relevance of contextual factors – that complicate the relation between research and practice. It is thus through a constant engagement with knowledge that stems from research as well as practice in collaborative settings that evidence can inform urban security work within IcARUS and beyond. This requires reducing distances between research and practice, e.g., by rendering research and language more practice-oriented and by fostering a culture of learning from mistakes.

Part two, the breakout sessions have enabled conversations amongst the project partners on the concrete topics the cities will address in the toolkit development and implementation phases. The work has focused on the problem statement, i.e. the description and framing of the situation to be addressed. An exercise has allowed the groups to map the relevant stakeholders and to regard the challenge from their perspective. Concrete next steps have been envisioned to organise the upcoming local activities and meetings in the respective partner city.

Part three has allowed a common reflection on knowledge transfer within IcARUS. The discussions that unfolded in this part have particularly focused on the relevance of implementation processes and enabled the partners to their complexities and potentials. Implementation has been understood as a collaborative, creative process that does not only consist of putting a plan into action, but of feedback loops, evaluation and adaptation, and that can engender innovation as it leads to developments in social practices. The participants shared the view that IcARUS represents a particularly good opportunity to promote an innovative approach to urban security through the co-production of the stakeholders involved, which combines social and technological aspects of innovation and can be of great importance beyond the project.

Overall, the workshop has helped to organise a transfer, or a transformation, of the knowledge gathered in IcARUS' framework so far: From an overview and summary evaluation and description of theoretical and practical knowledge from 30 years of urban security, to a more prescriptive, action-guiding knowledge that can support the toolkit development, testing and implementation that lies ahead for the project.



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This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 882748